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THE "MOSAIC THEORY"
AND FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
Benjamin M. Ostrandey*
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, an FBI-Metropolitan Police Department Safe Streets
Task Force began investigating Antoine Jones, owner of the D.C.
nightclub "Levels" and suspected drug kingpin, for narcotics viola-
tions.' Mr. Jones allegedly ran a drug ring that consisted of at least
nine other defendants and spanned from 2003 to 2005, involving hun-
dreds of kilograms of cocaine shipped from Mexico. 2 During the
investigation, law enforcement agents used a number of investigative
techniques, one being Global Positioning System (GPS) surveillance. 3
The agents secretly planted a GPS device on the undercarriage of a
Jeep exclusively driven by Mr. Jones, and for nearly one month the
device continuously tracked his movements. 4 At the conclusion of the
investigation, the Task Force obtained warrants and seized a large
quantity of contraband from the homes of several of the defendants. 5
They also searched an alleged "stash house," and seized ninety-seven
kilograms of cocaine, three kilograms of crack cocaine, and more
than $800,000 6-making it the largest cocaine seizure in D.C. history. 7
The digital location pattern that resulted from the month-long track-
ing of Jones-including his visits to the "stash house"-was used as
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2012; B.A., History,
Political Science, University of Iowa, 2009.
1 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Henri E.
Cauvin, Cash and Cocaine, but No Conviction:Jurors, Laryers Reflect on Where Case Prosecut-
ing District's Largest Drug Seizure Faltered, Wash. Post, Mar. 5, 2007, at B08.
2 Jim McElhatton, GPS Use Voids Conviction: Court Overturns D.C. Man's Drug Sen-
tence, WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 2010, at A2.
3 See United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74 (D.D.C. 2006), afrd in part,
rev'd in part sub nom. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544.
4 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555 & n.*.
5 See Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 74.
6 See id.
7 See McElhatton, supra note 2.
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evidence implicating his involvement in the cocaine trafficking.8 Mr.
Jones was eventually convicted of conspiracy to distribute and to pos-
sess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and
fifty grams or more of cocaine base.9 On appeal, however, the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Jones's conviction. 10
Relying on a novel and potentially revolutionizing theory1 1 in Fourth
Amendment law-the "mosaic theory"-the D.C. Circuit held that
prolonged GPS tracking constituted a "search" within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. 12 The "mosaic theory," often used in the
national security context, 13 holds that individual law enforcement
8 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 n.*.
9 See id. at 548.
10 See id. at 568.
11 See Orin Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces "Mosaic Theory" of Fourth Amendment, Holds
GPS Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, The Volokh Conspiracy (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46
PM), http://volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-
amendment-holds-gps-monitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search (calling Maynard and
its use of the "new 'mosaic' theory" a "potentially revolutionary Fourth Amendment
decision"). But see Julian Sanchez, GPS Tracking and a 'Mosaic Theory' of Government
Searches, CATO INST. (Aug. 11, 2010, 9:22 PM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/gps-
tracking-and-a-mosaic-theory-of-government-searches (questioning the novelty of the
"mosaic theory" in Fourth Amendment law).
12 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 555-63. The government's petition for rehearing en
banc was denied by a five-four vote. See United States v.Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
13 The "mosaic theory" was first expounded in a case regarding a government
action to enjoin a former CIA employee from publishing an expos6 of the agency. See
United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972). Although the court
enjoined the publishing of the expos6 on the constitutional executive right to secrecy
and a secrecy agreement the former agent had signed, the court gave a prudential
justification:
The significance of one item of information may frequently depend upon
knowledge of many other items of information. What may seem trivial to the
uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of
the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its proper
context. The courts, of course, are ill-equipped to become sufficiently
steeped in foreign intelligence matters to serve effectively in the review of
secrecy classifications in that area.
Id. at 1318. Since Marchetti, the "mosaic theory" has been a staple in national security
law. In his systematic analysis of the "mosaic theory" in Freedom of Information Act
law, David E. Pozen describes the theory:
The "mosaic theory" describes a basic precept of intelligence gathering: Dis-
parate items of information, though individually of limited or no utility to
their possessor, can take on added significance when combined with other
items of information. Combining the items illuminates their interrelation-
ships and breeds analytic synergies, so that the resulting mosaic of informa-
tion is worth more than the sum of its parts. In the context of national
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actions that are not searches become a search when aggregated, as the
whole reveals more than the individual acts it comprises. 14 Thus, in
the context of electronic tracking, this theory contends that although
the tracking of each individual movement is not a search, when aggre-
gated, the resulting location pattern becomes a search as it reveals
more than the individual movements it comprises.1 5
This Note suggests that despite the intuitive appeal of a "mosaic
theory" in Fourth Amendment law,16 it is not only wrong in principle
but also impractical in application. Rather than resorting to an aggre-
gation theory of the Fourth Amendment, this Note contends that the
use of potentially invasive pattern-detecting technologies that are not
security, the mosaic theory suggests the potential for an adversary to deduce
from independently innocuous facts a strategic vulnerability, exploitable for
malevolent ends.
David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information
Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 630 (2005); see also 32 C.F.R. § 701.31 (2010) (defining the
theory as "[t]he concept that apparently harmless pieces of information when assem-
bled together could reveal a damaging picture"). The "mosaic theory" has been suc-
cessfully invoked, often with merely perfunctory judicial review, by the government to
justify a document's higher confidentiality classification or the withholding of docu-
ments through the Freedom of Information Act. See, e.g., CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159,
178-79 (1985) (holding that the CIA need not disclose the institutional affiliates of
Agency-funded researchers who were previously held to be "intelligence sources");
Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928-29 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (holding that the Department of Justice need not disclose information regard-
ing persons detained in the wake of a major terrorist attack); N.J. Media Grp., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 217-20 (3d Cir. 2002) (denying media access to certain depor-
tation hearings on the basis of national security); Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116,
1118-20 (9th Cir. 1992) (denying request of an individual on trial for murder of
Iranian national for CIA records pertaining to that national); Knight v. CIA, 872 F.2d
660, 663-64 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding the CIA exempt from disclosing documents
relating to a sinking by French intelligence agents of a vessel belonging to an environ-
mental and pacifist organization on the grounds that the material could compromise
intelligence sources and methods); Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 150 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (protecting disclosure of legal bills and fee arrangements of private attorneys
retained by the CIA); Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (invoking
.mosaic theory" to support finding of state secrets privilege); see also Pozen, supra, at
630 (discussing the government's use of the theory to classify and withhold
documents).
14 See Kerr, supra note 11; Sanchez, supra note 11.
15 The underlying premise of the "mosaic theory" has also been termed the
"aggregation problem." See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth
Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1083, 1154 (2002).
16 See Sanchez, supra note 11 ("[T]here's an obvious intuitive appeal to the
["mosaic theory"], and indeed, we see that it fits our real world expectations about
privacy much better than the cruder theory that assumes the sum of 'public' facts
must always be itself a public fact.").
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deemed "searches" in the first instance should be statutorily regu-
lated. Part I examines the historical origins of the Fourth Amend-
ment and tracks its treatment of electronic tracking devices. Part II
discusses Maynard and the "mosaic theory," and ultimately suggests
that the "mosaic theory" is inconsistent with existing Fourth Amend-
ment precedent. Part III explores the far-reaching implications of the
"mosaic theory" in Fourth Amendment law. Finally, Part IV contends
that rather than regulating pattern-detecting technologies constitu-
tionally at the aggregate level, privacy interests should be statutorily
protected.
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ELECTRONIC TRACKING DEVICES
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon proba-
ble cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. 17
At its core, the Fourth Amendment protects individuals from
arbitrary and intrusive official conduct.'8 The Fourth Amendment's
mandates apply only to governmental conduct, which amounts to a
"search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Amendment. 19 Thus,
defining what constitutes a search or a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment is of critical importance. Despite the Fourth
17 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989) ("The
Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain
arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government or those acting at their direc-
tion."); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) ("The basic purpose of this
Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental offi-
cials."); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) ("The security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the Fourth Amend-
ment-is basic to a free society." (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)));
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ("The overriding function of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted
intrusion by the State."); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) ("The
point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not
that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.").
19 See I JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE § 6.01[A] (5th ed. 2010).
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Amendment's historical lineage, the term "search" has resisted a
canonical formulation. 20 For years, the determination of what consti-
tuted a search was property-based. 2 1 That is, for the Fourth Amend-
ment to be implicated, the government must have made a physical
intrusion into a "constitutionally protected area."22 Having difficulty
applying this property-based approach to developing technologies, 23
the Supreme Court reformulated the Fourth Amendment search anal-
ysis in the seminal 24 case of Katz v. United States.25
Katz was convicted in federal court on a charge of interstate trans-
mission of wagering information by telephone. 26 At trial, the court
allowed the government to introduce incriminating evidence of the
defendant's telephone conversations, which were overheard by FBI
agents who had attached to the outside of a public phone booth an
electronic listening and recording device. 27 On appeal, the Court
20 See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(a), at 430 (4th ed. 2004)
("The Supreme Court, quite understandably, has never managed to set out a compre-
hensive definition of the word 'searches' as it is used in the Fourth Amendment.").
21 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928) (holding that
wire tapping of defendant did not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment as "there has been [no] official search and seizure of his
person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual
physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of making a seizure"),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), and Berger, 388 U.S. 41;
United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (holding use of searchlight by boat-
swain not a search as "[t] here was [no] exploration below decks or under hatches");
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) ("[Fourth Amendment principles]
apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its employds of the sanctity of
a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property ....").
22 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961).
23 See 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 19, § 6.09[A] (noting that the Supreme
Court shifted away from the property doctrine in Katz in large part because techno-
logical advances made the doctrine an inadequate limitation on governmental intru-
sion); see also Michael Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title III: Rewriting the Law of
Electronic Surveillance, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3 (1983) ("The question of
electronic surveillance has long posed a classic confrontation between privacy inter-
ests and the need for effective law enforcement.").
24 See 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 19, § 6.03[A] ("Katz v. United States is
the seminal case in moderm 'search' law." (footnote omitted)); Anthony G. Amster-
dam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 383 (1974) ("[ Katz] is,
of course, now generally recognized as seminal and has rapidly become the basis of a
new formula of fourth amendment coverage.").
25 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
26 See id. at 348.
27 See id. at 348, 353.
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held that the government's attachment and use of the electronic lis-
tening device was a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 28 In so holding, the Court moved away from the
view that the scope of the Fourth Amendment "turn[ed] upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclo-
sure,"29 for "the correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is
not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase 'constitution-
ally protected area."30 Rather,
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.
3 1
In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan provided the framework
under which the Court would thereafter analyze Fourth Amendment
searches-the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test.32 Pursuant to
this test, "there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' '33 Although Katz was hailed as a dramatic shift in
Fourth Amendment law, it is not clear there was a profound diver-
gence from the property-based approach. 34
28 See id. at 353.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 350.
31 Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
32 See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
33 Id. The inclusion of the first requirement in the test, that a person have an
actual expectation of privacy, has been sharply criticized. See Amsterdam, supra note
24, at 384 ("An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a
statement of what Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth amendment protects. It
can neither add to, nor can its absence detract from, an individual's claim to fourth
amendment protection. If it could, the government could diminish each person's
subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on television ...
that we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveil-
lance."). Justice Harlan, the author of the test, eventually agreed. See United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The analysis must, in my
view, transcend the search for subjective expectations or legal attribution of assump-
tions of risk."). Although the Court has never rejected the test, they have at times
voiced caution in its application. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979)
("Situations can be imagined, of course, in which Katz' two-pronged inquiry would
provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protection.").
34 See 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 19, § 6.04[A] [1] ("One can look almost
in vain for a post-Katz ruling based on privacy that differs from the outcome one
would expect from pre-Katz property-rights trespass analysis."); John M. Burkoff,
2011] THE "MOSAIC THEORY" AND FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
In United States v. Knotts,3 5 the Supreme Court confronted the
issue of whether the warrantless use of an electronic tracking device
fell within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment.36 In Knotts, Minne-
sota narcotics officers received information that codefendants Arm-
strong and Petschen were obtaining large amounts of chloroform-
often used to manufacture illicit drugs-from a chemical company.
3 7
With the consent of the chemical company, the officers attached a
beeper38 inside a five-gallon container of chloroform, which the com-
pany was to give to the codefendants upon purchase. 39 After the
purchase by Armstrong, officers followed the car by maintaining visual
surveillance and by monitoring the signal emitted from the beeper.
40
During the codefendant's journey to respondent Knotts's secluded
cabin in rural Wisconsin, Petschen's evasive maneuvers precluded the
officers from maintaining visual surveillance. 41 With the assistance of
a helicopter, the signal from the beeper was tracked to the cabin,
where-after obtaining a search warrant-officers discovered a drug
laboratory. 42 In reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Court held that the
When Is a Search Not a "Search?" Fourth Amendment Doublethink, 15 U. TOL. L. REv. 515,
529 (1984) ("[I]t is worth pointing out that the apparent reformulation of the fourth
amendment's scope of application in Katz was not really so radical a proposition as
the majority made it out to be. Traditionally protected property interests are surely
among those areas of expectation generally, if not inevitably, included within the
ambit of 'well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms."' (footnote omitted)); Ric
Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-
First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1314 (2002) ("[The Supreme Court's]
continued emphasis on property law again demonstrates that, notwithstanding the
famous 'people, not places' language in the majority opinion, many courts properly
reject the idea that Katz supplanted a 'place-based' analysis, since the location of the
search and the defendant's relationship to that location are still a significant factor in
determining whether or not the search was valid." (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351)).
35 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
36 See id. at 277.
37 See id. at 278.
38 See id. at 277 ("A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which
emits periodic signals that can be picked up by a radio receiver."); I LAFAvE, supra
note 20, § 2.7(e) ("The police monitor the signals emitted by the beeper through the
use of a receiver installed in a vehicle or airplane. By such monitoring, they are able
to keep track of the movement of the object on which the beeper was placed, to
ascertain the continued presence of that object within premises, or even to determine
whether that object has been tampered with in a certain way.").
39 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
40 See id.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 278-79. According to the Court, nothing in the record indicated that
the monitoring of the chloroform continued past the point in which the initial deter-
mination of its location at the cabin was made. See id. at 278-79, 284-85.
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warrantless monitoring of the beeper was not a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.43 In so holding, the Court
rejected the argument that the defendants had an expectation of pri-
vacy in their movements:
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from
one place to another. When Petschen traveled over the public
streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look the
fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular direc-
tion, the fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final
destination when he exited from public roads onto private
property.4 4
Noting that the officers could have obtained the information through
visual surveillance, the Court held that "[n]othing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory fac-
ulties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science
and technology afforded them in this case." 45
A year later in United States v. Karo,46 the Court confronted the
issue of whether the monitoring of a beeper in a private residence not
open to visual surveillance is a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment.47  In Karo, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
installed and subsequently monitored a beeper placed within a can of
ether as it was transferred among several residences, a self-storage
facility, and ultimately to a residence where the ether was being used
to extract cocaine. 48 In holding the monitoring a search, the Court
distinguished the case from Knotts49 on the ground that the monitor-
ing revealed information about the interior of the private residence-
43 See id. at 285.
44 Id. at 281-82.
45 Id. at 282; see also id. at 285 ("Admittedly, because of the failure of the visual
surveillance, the beeper enabled the law enforcement officials in this case to ascertain
the ultimate resting place of the chloroform when they would not have been able to
do so had they relied solely on their naked eyes. But scientific enhancement of this
sort raises no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not also raise. A
police car following Petschen at a distance throughout his journey could have
observed him leaving the public highway and arriving at the cabin owned by respon-
dent, with the drum of chloroform still in the car.").
46 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
47 See id. at 714.
48 See id. at 708-09.
49 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 285 ("[T] here is no indication that the beeper was used
in any way to reveal information as to the movement of the drum within the cabin, or
in any way that would not have been visible to the naked eye from outside the
cabin.").
[VOL. 86:41740
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confirmation that the ether was actually within the residence and
remained there until a warrant was obtained-that could not have
otherwise been obtained absent a warrant, and such information was
not voluntarily exposed.50 Hence, "[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of
property that has been withdrawn from public view would present far
too serious a threat to privacy interests in the home to escape entirely
some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight. '51 Thus, after Knotts and
Karo, the government is free to conduct sustained and prolonged sur-
veillance of citizens as long as the monitoring is limited to movements
in public areas. 52
To date, the Supreme Court has yet to confront the issue of
whether GPS53 monitoring falls within the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment. Several federal circuit courts of appeals, however, have
held that GPS tracking in public areas is not a search. 54 In United
States v. Garcia,55 Judge Posner rejected the defendant's claim that the
use of a GPS device is a search. 56 In so holding, he compared GPS
devices to other non-searches, such as visual surveillance, cameras
50 See Karo, 468 U.S. at 715.
51 Id. at 716.
52 See 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 19, § 6.09[C] ("[T]he implication of
Knotts is that as long as monitoring is limited to movements of persons in non-private
areas, the government is free to conduct constant surveillance of citizens.").
53 See I LAFAvE, supra note 20, § 2.7 (Supp. 2007) ("Global Positioning System
(GPS) devices used by law enforcement agencies are small, but usually larger than
beepers. They contain not only a GPS satellite communications function that pin-
points the device's location. They also contain computerized recording devices, or
logs. Law enforcement agents attach a GPS device to the underside of a vehicle, in a
place where it will not be noticed. From then on the device automatically keeps a
detailed time and place itinerary of everywhere the vehicle travels and when and how
long it remains at various locations. Later, law enforcement agents remove the device
and download the detailed itinerary of where and when the vehicle traveled. Unlike
beepers, GPS devices do not require continuous monitoring by a law enforcement
agent." (quoting Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO N.U. L. Rv.
295, 316-17 (2004))).
54 See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2010); United
States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia,
474 F.3d 994, 997-98 (7th Cir. 2007). Like Knotts, all three courts reserved the ques-
tion of whether mass surveillance of vehicular movements constituted a search under
the Fourth Amendment. See Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610; Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217
n.2; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998; see also United States v. Walker, No. 2:10-cr-32, 2011 WL
651414, at *3, *8 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 11, 2011) (rejecting the defendant's reliance on
Maynard, noting that "the great weight of the law from other federal circuits rejects
[Maynards] view")
55 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007).
56 See id. at 996.
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mounted on lampposts, and satellite imaging.57 Conceding practical
differences exist between visual surveillance and the other non-
searches, Judge Posner concluded that "GPS tracking is on the same
side of the divide with the surveillance cameras and the satellite imag-
ing, and if what they do is not searching in Fourth Amendment terms,
neither is GPS tracking. '5 8 In United States v. Pineda-Moreno,59 the
Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the continuous monitoring of the
defendant over a four-month period did not constitute a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.60 The court quickly dis-
missed the defendant's argument that Kyllo v. United States61 heavily
modified Knotts.62 Thus, since "[t]he only information the agents
obtained from the tracking devices was a log of the locations where
[the defendant's] car traveled, information the agents could have
obtained by following the car," the electronic tracking did not amount
to a search.63 Lastly, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Marquez64
stated in dicta that "when police have reasonable suspicion that a par-
ticular vehicle is transporting drugs, a warrant is not required when,
while the vehicle is parked in a public place, they install a non-invasive
GPS tracking device on it for a reasonable period of time."65 Thus,
prior to Maynard, every federal circuit court of appeals to confront the
issue was consistent in holding that, pursuant to Knotts, the use of GPS
devices to monitor the movements of individuals did not constitute a
search. 66
57 See id. at 997.
58 Id.
59 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010).
60 See id. at 1217.
61 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding that "obtaining by sense-enhancing technol-
ogy any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have
been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area'-
constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in
general public use" (citation omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 512 (1961))).
62 See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216-17.
63 Id. at 1216.
64 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010).
65 Id. at 610. Although the Eighth Circuit agreed Knotts was controlling, the limi-
tations the court placed on the use of GPS surveillance-reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity and the use of the GPS device for a reasonable amount of time-are
nowhere to be found in Knotts or any other federal circuit decision regarding the use
of electronic tracking devices.
66 Two states have held electronic tracking to be a search under their respective
state constitutional counterparts to the Fourth Amendment. See People v. Weaver,
909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199-1203 (N.Y. 2009) ("Under [article I, section 12 of the New
York] Constitution, in the absence of exigent circumstances, the installation and use
2011] THE "MOSAIC THEORY" AND FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
II. Maynard and the "Mosaic Theory"
And then there was Maynard. In Maynard, the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the prolonged use of a GPS
device to track the defendant twenty-four hours a day for four weeks
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 67 The court first
addressed the question of whether Knotts was controlling.6 In
answering this question in the negative, the court relied upon a reser-
vation left open in Knotts.69 In Knotts, the respondent argued that the
result of holding electronic tracking outside of the reach of the
Fourth Amendment was that "twenty-four hour surveillance of any citi-
zen of this country will be possible, without judicial knowledge or
supervision. '70 In response, the Court concluded that "if such drag-
net-type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should
eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine
whether different constitutional principles may be applicable."'7 1 With
the questionable assertion that "dragnet-type law enforcement prac-
tices" refers to prolonged surveillance of a single individual, the May-
nard court held that Knotts was not controlling. 72
of a GPS device to monitor an individual's whereabouts requires a warrant supported
by probable cause."); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 222-24 (Wash. 2003) (holding
that the installation and use of a GPS device on a private vehicle is a search under
article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution); see also Commonwealth v. Con-
nolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 366-69 (Mass. 2009) (holding the use of a GPS tracking device
a seizure under article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights). Oregon held
the use of a radio transmitter to be a search under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon
Constitution. See State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1049 (Or. 1988). In so holding,
the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected defining searches in terms of "reasonable
expectations of privacy." Id. at 1044. Although the electronic tracking device at issue
in Campbell was a radio transmitter, it is likely that the court would characterize the
use of a GPS tracking device as a search.
67 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555-56 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
68 Id. at 556.
69 See id.
70 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983) (quoting Brief for Respon-
dent at 9, Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (No. 81-1802)).
71 Id. at 284.
72 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556. It is questionable whether the Knotts reservation in
fact referred to prolonged surveillance of a single individual. The three other federal
circuit courts of appeals to decide the issue expressed the belief that the reservation
was referring to mass surveillance. See United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610
(8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 n.2 (9th Cir.
2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007). Another plausible
view held by some commentators is that "dragnet-type law enforcement practices"
meant the monitoring of private places. See Kerr, supra note 11. Although the reser-
vation in Knotts was made in response to a claim that law enforcement agents would
be able to continuously monitor individuals, the context of the case lends support to
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The court then addressed whether the defendant's location pat-
tern was exposed to the public. 73 The court first held that the totality
of the defendant's movements was not exposed over the course of the
month-long investigation.7 4 The court reasoned that "unlike one's
movements during a single journey, the whole of one's movements
over the course of a month is not actually exposed to the public
because the likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is
effectively nil." 75 Next, the court introduced the "mosaic theory" into
Fourth Amendment law. 76 Relying on the "mosaic theory," the court
the latter interpretation. In Knotts, the Court repeatedly emphasized that the elec-
tronic tracking device was being used for the limited purpose of tracking the defen-
dant in public areas and in no way intruded upon the sanctity of the home. See Knotts,
460 U.S. at 284-85. Although the Maynard court contends that Knotts distinguished
between the use of a beeper to discover limited information from a discrete trip from
information discovered through sustained monitoring, the language from Knotts used
in support of this proposition clearly made no such distinction. See Maynard, 615 F.3d
at 556. Rather, the distinction made in Knotts was between the limited information
discovered through the use of the beeper in public areas, and information that would
be discovered by such use in private areas. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 284-85. Indeed, a
year later in Karo it was the use of an electronic tracking device to monitor private
areas-not the four-month continuous tracking of a can of ether-that was held to
violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
73 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 561-62. The "mosaic theory" is not novel with respect to state search and
seizure law. Without labeling them as such, in holding that electronic tracking is a
search under their respective state constitutions, State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217 (Wash.
2003), and People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009), both make mosaic-type
arguments. In Jackson the court stated:
[T]he intrusion into private affairs made possible with a GPS device is quite
extensive as the information obtained can disclose a great deal about an
individual's life.... In this age, vehicles are used to take people to a vast
number of places that can reveal preferences, alignments, associations, per-
sonal ails and foibles. The GPS tracking devices record all of these travels,
and thus can provide a detailed picture of one's life.
Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223. Noting that the "inquiry under article I, section 7 is broader
than that under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution," it makes
logical sense for the court to classify the "uninterrupted, 24-hour a day surveillance
possible through use of a GPS device, which does not depend upon whether an
officer could in fact have maintained visual contact," as a search under the state con-
stitution. Id. at 222-23. In Weaver, the court stated:
The whole of a person's progress through the world, into both public and
private spatial spheres, can be charted and recorded over lengthy periods
possibly limited only by the need to change the transmitting unit's batter-
ies.... What the technology yields and records with breathtaking quality and
quantity is a highly detailed profile, not simply of where we go, but by easy
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concluded that the whole of Mr. Jones's movements was not construc-
tively exposed.77 The court reasoned:
The whole of one's movements over the course of a month is
not constructively exposed to the public because, like a rap sheet,
that whole reveals far more than the individual movements it com-
prises. The difference is not one of degree but of kind, for no sin-
gle journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the distinction
between a day in the life and a way of life, not the departure from a
routine that, like the dog that did not bark in the Sherlock Holmes
story, may reveal even more. 78
In other words, "[p] rolonged surveillance reveals types of information
not revealed by short-term surveillance, such as what a person does
repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he does ensemble. These
types of information can each reveal more about a person than does
any individual trip viewed in isolation." 79 Thus, according to the
"mosaic theory," although the individual acts are exposed and are
therefore not rendered searches, the acts viewed collectively become a
search .80
Beyond the Maynard court's questionable treatment of the "drag-
net-type law enforcement practices" reservation in Knotts,8 1 the opin-
ion is inconsistent with existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
inference, of our associations-political, religious, amicable and amorous, to
name only a few-and of the pattern of our professional and avocational
pursuits.
Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199-1200. In fact, the Colorado Supreme Court explicitly
used the "mosaic theory" to hold the use of a pen register a search under the Colo-
rado Constitution. See People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 141-42 (Colo. 1983). The
court held:
The pen register recorded each telephone number dialed by the defendant
as well as the date and time of each telephone call. Knowledge of these facts
can often yield inferential knowledge of the content of the conversation
itself. In addition, a pen register record holds out the prospect of an even
greater intrusion in privacy when the record itself is acquired by the govern-
ment, which has a technological capacity to convert basic data into a virtual
mosaic of a person's life.
Id.
77 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561-62.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 562.
80 But see UNITED STATES V. JONES, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle,
CJ., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) ("The reasonable expectation
of privacy as to a person's movements on the highway is, as concluded in Knotts, zero.
The sum of an infinite number of zero-value parts is also zero.").
81 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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at least two respects. 8 2 First, Maynard conflicts with the Supreme
Court's voluntary exposure analysis. The Court has often classified
theoretical or limited disclosures of information as complete expo-
sures warranting no Fourth Amendment protection.83 In fact, the
Maynard court's holding that "the whole of one's movements over the
course of a month is not actually exposed to the public because the
likelihood anyone will observe all those movements is effectively nil"
was implicitly rejected in Knotts. In Knotts, it was practically impossible
for an individual to observe the whole of the defendant's interstate
movements-the defendants had in fact evaded the visual surveillance
of the law enforcement and bystanders would have observed only a
fraction of the whole trip.84 That is, although an individual bystander
may have viewed codefendants Armstrong and Petschen at mile ten of
their journey, that particular bystander would not have known that
the automobile contained a container of chloroform or that the vehi-
cle and container would come to rest at Knotts's cabin. This was irrel-
evant, however, for the purposes of the exposure analysis.85 Although
82 SEE JONES, 625 F.3d at 767 (Sentelle, C.J., dissenting from the denial of rehear-
ing en banc) ("[Maynard] is inconsistent not only with every other federal circuit
which has considered the case, but more importantly, with controlling Supreme
Court precedent set forth in [Knotts].").
83 See 2 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. McKENNA, WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING
§ 30:19 (3d ed. 2007) ("[A]ny 'knowing exposure' of information to the public in
effect waives Fourth Amendment protection from purposeful police surveillance of a
similar kind, even if the exposure in question is far more theoretical than real.");
Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J.
549, 566 (1990) ("[T]he Supreme Court has frequently denied Americans fourth
amendment protection for information disclosed for limited use on the theory that
this disclosure amounts to a complete renunciation of any privacy interest in that
information."); Andrew E. Taslitz, The Fourth Amendment in the Twenty-First Centuy:
Technology, Privacy, and Human Emotions, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 133-34
(2002) (noting that the Court's "framework ... readily finds that suspects 'assume the
risk' that any information disclosure becomes a revelation to many or all").
84 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278-79 (1983).
85 See 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 19, § 6.09[C] ("The implication of
Knotts is that as long as it is hypothetically conceivable (although, in some cases,
nearly impossible practically) to obtain information in a non-technologically-
enhanced manner from a lawful vantage point, it is irrelevant that, instead, the gov-
ernment uses an electronic tracking device to obtain the same information."); Wayne
R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment Today: A Bicentennial Appraisa4 32 VILL. L. REV. 1061,
1082 (1987) ("But to learn what the beeper revealed-that chemicals purchased in
Minneapolis were now in a particular secluded cabin 100 miles away-would have
taken an army of bystanders in ready and willing communication with one another.");
Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRiM. L. REV.
257, 376 (1984) ("Electronic monitoring of a car, however, enables the police to trace
its every movement, day and night, for an extended period of time, something they
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"in ordinary life, we often reasonably suppose the privacy or secrecy of
certain facts... that could in principle be inferred from the combina-
tion of other facts that are (severally) clearly public, because it would
be highly unusual for all of them to be observed by the same public,"8 6
such facts are not given Fourth Amendment protection under Knotts.
While it is true that the surveillance in Knotts was conducted over one
trip spanning a day, it is not clear why under Knotts's analysis continu-
ous surveillance would be treated any differently. Thus, pursuant to
Knotts, an expectation of privacy does not exist "as to the aggregate of
information disclosed only in fragments to hypothetical bystanders."8 7
This principle was not altered by Karo.88
Second, the Supreme Court has on multiple occasions implicitly
rejected the proposition that the Fourth Amendment analysis is
altered when an investigatory technique is prolonged to the point
where information may be accumulated. In Smith v. Maryland,8 9 the
Court recognized that a pen register may be used to examine perma-
nent or lengthy phone records, but rejected arguments90 that this fact
implicated the Fourth Amendment because the record of phone num-
bers dialed would reveal intimate details of an individual's life. 91 In
addition, it is particularly noteworthy that in Karo, the prolonged
duration of the electronic tracking-spanning several months-
played no role in holding the use a search. 92
could accomplish by visual surveillance, if at all, only by assigning a small army of
agents to the task.").
86 Sanchez, supra note 11.
87 1 LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 2.7(e), at 763.
88 See id.
89 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
90 See id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("The numbers dialed from a private
telephone-although certainly more prosaic than the conversation itself-are not
without 'content.' ... I doubt there are any who would be happy to have broadcast to
the world a list of the local or long distance numbers they have called. This is not
because such a list might in some sense be incriminating, but because it easily could
reveal the identities of the persons and places called, and thus reveal the most inti-
mate details of a person's life."); id. at 751 (Marshall,J., dissenting) ("The prospect of
unregulated governmental monitoring will undoubtedly prove disturbing even to
those with nothing illicit to hide. Many individuals, including members of unpopular
political organizations or journalists with confidential sources, may legitimately wish
to avoid disclosure of their personal contacts.").
91 See id. at 745-46 (majority opinion).
92 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708-10, 715 (1984).
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE "MosAMc THEORY" IN FOURTH
AMENDMENT LAW
The application of the "mosaic theory" to the Fourth Amend-
ment would not only be wrong in principle, it would be impractical in
application. Maynard is steeped in uncertainty as to the effects of the
Fourth Amendment's recognition of an aggregation theory of
searches. In articulating a novel theory of Fourth Amendment law,
Maynard lacks an accompanying elucidation of the manner in which
the theory functions in the Fourth Amendment. Maynard left little
guidance as to the determination of the proper scope of the mosaic,
whether the theory would implicate other pattern-detecting investiga-
tory techniques, and the appropriate standard of judicial review.
A. The Creation and Scope of the Mosaic
Maynard left little guidance as to what durational threshold must
to be crossed in order for the use of pattern-detecting technology to
be sufficiently prolonged as to render it a search.93 Without a clearly
demarcated line, law enforcement agents, judges, and individuals can-
not know when an aggregate of information will receive Fourth
Amendment protection. Law enforcement agents are left to speculate
as to how much is too much. 9 4 This lack of clarity will deter law
enforcement agents from utilizing the full extent of their investigatory
power. This is even more problematic with respect to the "mosaic the-
ory's" creation of retroactive unconstitutionality. 95 As soon as a pat-
93 See United States v. Sparks, No. 10-10067-WGY, slip op. at 9 (D. Mass. Nov. 10,
2010) (rejecting Maynards aggregation approach as it "leaves police officers with a
rule that is vague and unworkable. It is unclear when surveillance becomes so pro-
longed as to have crossed the threshold and created this allegedly intrusive mosaic.");
Kerr, supra note 11 ("Much of the problem is knowing when the line is crossed when
a bunch of non-searches become a search."); Sanchez, supra note 11 (calling the ques-
tion of when "individual instances of permissible monitoring become a search requir-
ingjudicial approval" a "thorny" one).
94 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 883-84 (2004) (" [1] nterstitial rulemak-
ing that leaves the rules unclear lessens the clarity of the limits on the government's
powers to invade privacy, underdeterring police behavior in some contexts and
overdeterring it in others."); id. at 861 ("[T]he rules [of criminal procedure] tell
government agents what they can and cannot do to collect evidence of crime and
identify wrongdoers. Because these rules limit government power, rule clarity mini-
mizes official discretion and encourages compliance. Unclear rules mean unclear
limits on government power, increasing the likelihood of abuses by aggressive govern-
ment officials.").
95 See Sparks, No. 10-10067-WGY, slip op. at 9 (recognizing that under Maynard's
aggregation approach "conduct that is initially constitutionally sound could later be
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tern is created, previously permissible individual law enforcement
steps become unconstitutional. Because the "mosaic theory" retroac-
tively renders the entire mosaic unconstitutional and subject to sup-
pression, law enforcement agents will be even more hesitant in
exercising the full extent of their investigatory power.
Further, if the "mosaic theory" in the Fourth Amendment is pre-
mised on the idea that "prolonged GPS monitoring reveals an inti-
mate picture of the subject's life that he expects no one to have-
short perhaps of his spouse,"96 who has the burden of proof with
respect to whether the prolonged surveillance has in fact revealed an
intimate picture of an individual's life and thus created a mosaic?
Unless the location of a "stash-house" is an intimate detail, Maynard
can be read to stand for the proposition that warrantless prolonged
GPS surveillance is per se unconstitutional. Such an approach would
be over-inclusive in that prolonged location monitoring that does not
result in a pattern, or a pattern that does not reveal intimate details,
would be rendered a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment and therefore subject to suppression.
Once the mosaic threshold is crossed and a mosaic is created, the
question that arises is to how to define the scope of the mosaic. If law
enforcement officials engage in a number of sustained investigatory
techniques-as they often do-it is likely that whole investigations will
be called into question. That is, if a pattern is detected only through
the use of multiple investigatory techniques, and the theory is applied
consistently, the investigation in its entirety will be rendered a
search.97 In this respect, the retroactive effect of the "mosaic theory"
takes on greater significance. Rather than having the entire investiga-
tion held inadmissible and subject to suppression, law enforcement
agents will be overly cautious as to the amount of surveillance con-
ducted. The lack of clarity as to how prolonged the surveillance must
be to render it a search, whether intimate details need in fact emerge,
and what the proper scope of the mosaic is will provide defendants
with an arsenal to attack every police investigation.
deemed impermissible if it becomes part of the aggregate"); Kerr, supra note 11
("[T]he mosaic theory has the bizarre consequences of creating retroactive
unconstitutionality.").
96 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
97 See Kerr, supra note 11 ("[I]f the Fourth Amendment recognizes a mosaic the-
ory, then the Fourth Amendment will regulate entire investigations as a whole: The
question will be whether the investigation measured in the aggregate amounts to a
Fourth Amendment violation.").
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B. Implication of Previously Accepted Investigatory Techniques
One of the most serious implications of the "mosaic theory" in
Fourth Amendment law is that it calls into question the validity of pre-
viously accepted forms of surveillance. GPS surveillance is not the
only form of surveillance that provides law enforcement with a com-
prehensive and detailed record of someone's movements or affairs
when it is sustained on a prolonged basis. Thus, the "mosaic theory,"
which focuses on the resulting patterns created by individual law
enforcement acts that in and of themselves are not searches, naturally
calls into question other accepted investigative techniques that are
performed on a sufficiently prolonged basis.98 For instance, the
"mosaic theory" calls into question the use of pen registers99 and trap
and trace devices, 100 which have been held to not implicate the
Fourth Amendment.' 0 a The "mosaic theory" would also seemingly
98 SEE United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) ("[I]t would appear... that this
novel aggregation approach to the reasonable expectation of privacy would prohibit
not only GPS-augmented surveillance, but any other police surveillance of sufficient
length to support consolidation of data into the sort of pattern or mosaic contem-
plated by the panel.").
99 See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006) ("[T]he term 'pen register' means a device or
process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling informa-
tion transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic commu-
nication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information shall not include
the contents of any communication, but such term does not include any device or
process used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication service
for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services pro-
vided by such provider or any device or process used by a provider or customer of a
wire communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordi-
nary course of its business."). Relying on a "mosaic theory" argument, the Colorado
Supreme Court held the warrantless use of pen registers unconstitutional under the
Colorado constitutional counterpart to the Fourth Amendment. See People v.
Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 141-42 (Colo. 1983); see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 2.7
("The use of... pen registers . . .often results in the discovery of one's continuing
associations with other persons.").
100 See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4) ("[T]he term 'trap and trace device' means a device or
process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the
originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information
reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, pro-
vided, however, that such information shall not include the contents of any
communications.").
101 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless installation and use of a pen register).
Although law enforcement use of pen registers and trap and trace devices do not
implicate the Fourth Amendment, ex ante judicial approval is statutorily mandated.
See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
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implicate the prolonged use of a mail cover102 as an investigatory tech-
nique. 10 3 Although the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue,
courts have held that the warrantless use of a mail cover does not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment. 10 4 Another accepted investigatory tech-
nique that can reveal very intimate details of an individual's life-
particularly if sustained for a prolonged basis-is garbage inspec-
tions.10 5 It could plausibly be argued that the patterns that result
from the prolonged use of garbage inspections are much more intru-
sive than any pattern resulting from the use of a GPS device. 10 6 The
same could be said about prolonged video surveillance.10 7 It is well
102 See 39 C.F.R. § 233.3(c) (1) (2010) ("Mail cover is the process by which a non-
consensual record is made of any data appearing on the outside cover of any sealed or
unsealed class of mail matter, or by which a record is made of the contents of any
unsealed class of mail matter as allowed by law, to obtain information in order to: (i)
Protect national security, (ii) Locate a fugitive, (iii) Obtain evidence of commission or
attempted commission of a crime, (iv) Obtain evidence of a violation or attempted
violation of a postal statute, or (v) Assist in the identification of property, proceeds or
assets forfeitable under law."); see also id. § 233.3(c) (6) (" Crime, for the purposes of
[§ 233.3], is any commission of an act or the attempted commission of an act that is
punishable by law or by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.").
103 See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 2.7(a) ("One investigative technique which is
employed to determine the relationships and associations of a person and to obtain
leads into other details of his life is the mail cover." (footnotes omitted)).
104 See, e.g., United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 177 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding
that the use of mail covers to obtain information from the exterior of an individual's
mail does not violate the Fourth Amendment given that "the information would
foreseeably be available to postal employees"). Like pen registers and trap and trace
devices, although the use of mail covers does not fall within the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment, its use as an investigative technique is statutorily governed. See infra
note 152 and accompanying text.
105 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless search and seizure of garbage left for
collection outside the curtilage of the home).
106 See id. at 50 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A single bag of trash testifies eloquently
to the eating, reading, and recreational habits of the person who produced it. A
search of trash, like a search of the bedroom, can relate intimate details about sexual
practices, health, and personal hygiene. Like rifling through desk drawers or inter-
cepting phone calls, rummaging through trash can divulge the target's financial and
professional status, political affiliations and inclinations, private thoughts, personal
relationships, and romantic interests."); 1 LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 2.6(c) ("[O]ne's
trash may expose 'intimate areas of an individual's personal affairs' and 'can reveal
much about a person's activities, associations, and beliefs."' (quoting Cal. Bankers
Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78-79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring))).
107 See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space:
Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. Rnv.
1349, 1409 (2004) (noting in the context of video surveillance that "even where a
person does not worry about a particular action being observed in isolation, such
actions may reveal private thoughts or goals when viewed in the aggregate").
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settled that video surveillance in public areas does not give rise to a
Fourth Amendment issue.' 08 Thus, video cameras may be placed
outside of an individual's residence, and so long as the cameras are
incapable of viewing the interior of the residence, no Fourth Amend-
ment right is infringed upon.10 9
Since Maynard, the "mosaic theory" has in fact been used as the
basis for holding a previously accepted investigatory technique a
search. In In re Application of the United States of America for an Order
Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information,1" 0 Magistrate
Judge Orenstein denied the government's application for an order
under the Stored Communications Act 1' directing a service provider
to disclose two months worth of historical cell-site location informa-
tion.1 12 According to Magistrate Judge Orenstein:
The Maynard court's concern with sustained GPS tracking over the
course of a month was not its formally continuous nature, but
rather the fact that it results in a vast collection of specific data
points that, viewed together, convey the "intimate picture" of a sub-
ject's life. It is the ability to amass a collection of such points, and
not the ability to trace the route from each one to the next, that
carries with it the ability to resolve those points into a comprehensi-
ble picture.' 13
Applying the "mosaic theory" to historical cell-site information, Magis-
trate Judge Orenstein concluded that the Fourth Amendment
required the government to obtain a warrant based on a showing of
probable cause.11 4
The most significant implication of the "mosaic theory," however,
is that it calls into question the governmental use of prolonged visual
108 See 2 FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 83, § 30:24(a); 1 LAFAVE, supra note 20,
§ 2.7(f).
109 See 2 FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 83, § 30:24(a); Christopher Slobogin,
Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 Miss. L.J.
213, 236 (2002).
110 736 F. Supp. 2d 578 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
111 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006 & Supp. lII 2009).
112 See In re Application of the United States of America, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 579.
113 Id. at 595; see also In re Application of the United States of America for an
Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell-Site Information, No. 10-MC-0897
(JO), 2010 WL 5437209, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2010) ("Location information is not
a simple business record and, as convincingly explained in Maynard, it can effectively
convey details that reveal the most sensitive information about a person's life-informa-
tion that goes far beyond the ordinary course of the service provider's business.").
114 See In re Application of the United States of America, 736 F. Supp. 2d at 579.
[VOL. 86:41752
2011] THE "MOSAIC THEORY" AND FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW
surveillance in criminal investigations. 15 In Maynard, the court
addressed the issue of the possible extension of the "mosaic theory" to
prolonged visual surveillance.1 16 Although the court ultimately
declined to decide whether such a situation would constitute a search
under the new theory, it suggested that visual surveillance would not
be implicated.1 17 The court noted that practically, law enforcement
agents do not have the capability to sustain visual monitoring for a
duration that exposes information not revealed to the public.1 18 This
argument is unpersuasive to the extent that it suggests that a mosaic is
only created if the whole of one's movements is captured. A pattern
can be created, and thus intimate details revealed, by the aggregation
of individual law enforcement steps not necessarily constituting the
whole of the investigatory techniques employed. The court implicitly
recognizes this, as even continuous GPS tracking of a vehicle does not
reveal the entirety of one's movements, but rather only the move-
ments of a particular vehicle. Further, the dismissal of the implication
of visual surveillance is problematic to the extent that it relies on the
probability of law enforcement success. Such probability, however,
must be viewed in relation to the factual context in which the investi-
gation is conducted, and not in the abstract. To be sure, it is not
beyond the realm of possibility that a properly equipped and
resourced law enforcement unit would be capable of monitoring an
unsuspecting individual for a continuous period of time sufficient to
create a mosaic.
As a theoretical matter, the court reasoned that in contrast to
prolonged GPS monitoring, the extension of the "mosaic theory" to
visual surveillance would fail as the means used to uncover private
115 SEE United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) ("I cannot discern any distinction
between the supposed invasion by aggregation of data between the GPS-augmented
surveillance and a purely visual surveillance of substantial length."); United States v.
Sparks, No. 10-10067-WGY, slip op. at 9 (D. Mass. Nov. 10, 2010) ("[A] rule prohibit-
ing prolonged GPS surveillance due to the quantity or quality of information it
accumulates would also incidentally outlaw warrantless visual surveillance."); see also ]
LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 2.7(f) ("A moving surveillance may be conducted, either
briefly or as long as several months, in order to determine if a particular individual is
engaged in criminal activity or-more likely-to identify all of the participants in an
ongoing criminal conspiracy.").
116 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
117 See id.
118 See id. The court also applied this reasoning to video surveillance, where
according to the court "photographic surveillance would require a net of video cam-
eras so dense and so widespread as to catch a person's every movement, plus the
manpower to piece the photographs together." Id.
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information would not defeat one's expectation of privacy. 119 The
court's analogy to the distinction between the placement of under-
cover agents and wiretapping 120 overlooks the fact that here, warrant-
less GPS tracking and visual surveillance are constitutional in the first
instance. In fact, the "mosaic theory" focuses on the nature of the
information revealed-a pattern exposing intimate details-and does
not focus on the investigatory method used to attain such informa-
tion. Beyond prolonged visual and video surveillance, Maynard does
not express a view as to whether other investigatory techniques would
be called into question by the "mosaic theory." This analysis suggests
that the "mosaic theory," if consistently applied, would implicate the
cumulative effect of previously accepted surveillance methods. 121 It is
in this capacity that the "mosaic theory" has the potential to revolu-
tionize the Fourth Amendment.
C. Standard for Issuance
A question left open in Maynard is what standard of review is nec-
essary for the use of pattern-detecting investigatory techniques in
criminal investigations. That is, in holding that the prolonged use of
pattern-detecting technology was a search, the court failed to specify
what kind of review would be sufficient. Thus, by saying that this type
of investigative technique is more than just the use of a tracking
device and that the prolonged surveillance is more intrusive and
necessitates some kind of review, the question clearly becomes what
kind of review is necessary. By failing to provide such guidance, the
Maynard court left law enforcement agents to speculate as to what
information they must provide to obtain authorization and left courts
to speculate as to where on the spectrum ofjudicial review this height-
ened surveillance falls.
119 See id. at 566.
120 See id.
121 Judge Posner's analysis of GPS tracking in Garcia supports the conclusion that
the "mosaic theory" will, if applied consistently to all investigatory techniques that
result in a pattern, affect other accepted investigatory methods. In deciding that GPS
tracking was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Judge Pos-
ner stated that "GPS tracking is on the same side of the divide with the surveillance
cameras and the satellite imaging, and if what they do is not searching in Fourth
Amendment terms, neither is GPS tracking." United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994,
997 (7th Cir. 2007). In the converse, if the prolonged use of a GPS tracking device
results in a search because it creates a mosaic, the prolonged use of surveillance cam-
eras and satellite imaging should accordingly be characterized as searches, provided
of course that a pattern emerged from the aggregation of individual uses.
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By categorizing the retrieval of digital location patterns as a
search, it does not necessarily follow that the absence of a warrant
based on probable cause 122 renders the search unconstitutional. The
Maynard court left open the question of "whether, absent a warrant,
either reasonable suspicion or probable cause would have been suffi-
cient to render the use of the GPS lawful."' 23 Although the Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized that searches absent a warrant based
upon a standard of probable cause are generally unreasonable,1 24
today many searches require less than probable cause to be justi-
fied. 125 In Terry v. Ohio,126 the Court imported a reasonableness test-
first articulated by the Court in the administrative search case of
Camara v. Municipal Court127-into criminal investigations. Pursuant
to this balancing test, in order to assess an officer's conduct,
as a general proposition, it is necessary "first to focus upon the gov-
ernmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon
the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen," for
there is "no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by
balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which
the search [or seizure] entails."128
122 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) ("The task of the issuing magis-
trate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the cir-
cumstances set forth in the affidavit before him .... there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place."); Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) ("In dealing with probable cause, however, as
the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and pru-
dent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative
to what must be proved."); 1 DRSSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 19, § 8.02 [A] (" 'Proba-
ble cause' exists when the facts and circumstances within an officer's personal knowl-
edge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in
themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that ... in the case
of a search, a specifically described item subject to seizure will be found in the place
to be searched.").
123 UNITED STATES V. JoNES, 625 F.3d 766, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Ginsburg, Tatel &
Griffith, JJ., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
124 See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989)
(emphasizing that while "a search must be supported, as a general matter, by a war-
rant issued upon probable cause . . . neither a warrant nor probable cause . . . is an
indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance").
125 See I DRESSLER & MIcHAESt.S, supra note 19, § 8.06; Burkoff, supra note 34, at
542; Solove, supra note 15, at 1119; Wasserstrom, supra note 85, at 309.
126 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
127 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
128 Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (alterations in original) (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at
534-35, 536-37).
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Thus, if the balance weighs in favor of the search, a search may be
justified notwithstanding the absence of probable cause. 129 Although
Camara dealt with administrative searches and Terry with investigatory
stops, this reasonableness approach has been extended to other
search and seizure contexts 3 0-including searches in public areas.1
3 1
Under this reasonableness approach, many warrantless searches have
been justified on the basis of reasonable suspicion, rather than proba-
ble cause.132 Furthermore, a number of searches have likewise been
upheld as reasonable in the absence of suspicion of any kind. 133
Even if an ex post reasonableness test is ultimately rejected, it
does not follow that the warrant must be issued only on probable
cause. 1 34 If the use of pattern-detecting investigatory methods is
viewed as overly intrusive, a heightened standard above probable
cause may be warranted. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
129 See id.; see also OTIS H. STEPHENS & RICHARD A. GLENN, UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 143 (2006) ("Today, under a vast array of circumstances, war-
rantless searches and seizures are nevertheless reasonable, at least in the opinion of
the nation's highest court.").
130 See THOMAS N. MCINNIs, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 153
(2009); LaFave, supra note 85, at 1070-71.
131 See BRUCE A. NEWMAN, AGAINST THAT "POwERFUL ENGINE OF DESPOTISM" 102
(2007) ("[I]n the cases involving searches in public areas that have reached the
Court, it has ruled that the reasonableness clause, not the warrant clause, is
controlling.").
132 See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990) (protective residence
sweeps); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725-26 (1987) (search of public
employee); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (search of public school
students); see also 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 19, § 8.07[C] [1] ("[S]ome
searches may be conducted on a lesser level of suspicion than probable cause.").
133 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (drug
testing of public school students); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455
(1990) (highway sobriety checkpoint); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S.
602, 616-18 (1989) (drug and alcohol testing of public employees); United States v.
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (border searches); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 373-76 (1976) (car inventory searches); see also 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS,
supra note 19, § 8.07[C] [1] ("[I]n a few circumstances, where the intrusion on pri-
vacy is especially slight, and society's interest in conducting the search or seizure is
unusually great, government officers may act without any individualized suspicion.").
134 See Katz, supra note 83, at 584 n.124 (proposing electronic tracking be classi-
fied as intrusions and be subjected to an intermediate standard of reasonable suspi-
cion); Slobogin, supra note 109, at 218 (contending that "given its relatively
unintrusive nature, most public surveillance of individuals does not require probable
cause in the traditional sense"). But see Thomas C. Marks, Jr. & Robert Batey, Elec-
tronic Tracking Devices: Fourth Amendment Problems and Solutions, 67 Ky. L.J. 987, 1002
(1979) (contending that, in the context of electronic tracking devices, "probable
cause to believe the monitored item is being used in ongoing criminal activity ...
seems to be the best standard for determining whether a warrant should issue").
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Safe Streets Act provides for extraordinary review of electronic surveil-
lance, with full probable cause, and alternative mechanisms. 13 5 Title
III, as amended by Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act of 1986 (ECPA) ,136 regulates the interception of wire, oral, and
electronic communications.1 3 7 The requirements for an interception
order are more onerous than what would be required under the
Fourth Amendment. 138 Tide III excempts from the definition of
"electronic communication". "any communication from a tracking
device (as defined in § 3117 of [Title 18]).' I39 It could be argued that
the digital location patterns are something different, something more
intrusive than electronic tracking devices, and thus should be read to
fall within the meaning of "electronic communication" under
§ 2510(12). This, however, does not seem plausible as the definition
of "electronic communication" excludes "any communication from a
tracking device,"' 40 thus foreclosing the argument that although the
interception of the digital location pattern was derived from the use
135 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
136 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
§§ 101-111, 100 Stat. 1848, 1848-59 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2522).
137 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522.
138 The interception order must be authorized by a high-level Department ofJus-
tice official and signed by a federal judge. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2006). 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(3) provides the probable cause showing that must be made:
(3) Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order .. . if the judge
determines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that-
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has com-
mitted, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in section 2516 of
this chapter;
(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning
that offense will be obtained through such interception; ...
(d) except as provided in [18 U.S.C. § 2518(11)], there is probable cause for
belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, oral, or elec-
tronic communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be
used, in connection with the commission of such offense, or are leased to, listed
in the name of, or commonly used by such person.
Id. § 2518(3). In addition, the judge must also determine on the basis of the facts
that "normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." Id. § 2518(3) (c).
Further, the interception must "be conducted in such a way as to minimize the inter-
ception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under [Title III]."
Id. § 2518(5). Finally, any Title III order is time-limited to thirty days, although the
government can request an extension. See id. § 2518(5).
139 Id. § 2510(12) (C).
140 Id.
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of an electronic tracking device, it was nonetheless governed by the
mandates of Title III. 14
1
Even though Title III will likely be held not to govern a request
for digital location patterns, courts could still analyze such requests
under the mandates of Title III. Although the plain language of Title
III appears to exclude the interception of location patterns arising out
of the use of tracking devices, courts could still use Title III as a guide
for the constitutional standard. The adoption of the Title III stan-
dards to a type of surveillance not covered by Title III is not novel. In
United States v. Torres,1 4 2 Judge Posner held that, in the absence of
statutory regulations governing the issuance of warrants for private
video surveillance, the federal government may conduct video surveil-
lance of the interior of a private building if the warrant under which
the surveillance was conducted complied with the statutory mandates
of Title 111.143 Although Title III did not govern video surveillance,
the "exceedingly intrusive" and "inherently indiscriminate" nature of
the private video surveillance compelled the adoption of the statutory
mandates of Title III as a guide for the issuance of warrants authoriz-
ing private video surveillance.1 44 Thus, in the absence of statutory reg-
ulations governing the issuance of warrants for pattern-detecting
technologies, if the surveillance is of a highly intrusive and indiscrimi-
141 Id. § 3117(b) defines the term "tracking device" as "an electronic or mechani-
cal device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object." Id.
§ 3117(b).
142 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984).
143 See id. at 884-85.
144 See id. at 882. Other federal courts have likewise adopted the mandates of Title
III in the private video surveillance context. See United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d
411, 416 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 542 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mesa-
Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1438 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821
F.2d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir.
1986); see also 2 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 83, § 30:25 (calling the adoption of
Title III requirements in the video surveillance context "plausible and sensible," but
criticizing the courts' treatment of such applications as constitutionally mandated);
Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment: Seeing Through
Kyllo s Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1393, 1433-37
(2002) (proposing legislative enactment of Title III-like standards for enhanced visual
surveillance). But see Ric Simmons, Can Winston Save Us from Big Brother? The Need for
Judicial Consistency in Regulating Hyper-Intrusive Searches, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 547, 589
(2003) (criticizing this practice in the belief that courts "have relinquished their judi-
cial duty to interpret the Constitution, an abdication which.., is especially problem-
atic when it occurs in the context of surveillance techniques that are both
extraordinarily intrusive and becoming more common and more technologically
sophisticated with every year").
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nate nature, the adoption of the heightened requirements of Title III
may be warranted.
On the other end of the spectrum, after concluding that this type
of surveillance is a search, a standard less than probable cause may be
deemed appropriate. 145 For instance, if the use of pattern-detecting
investigatory techniques is not viewed as overly intrusive, a standard of
reasonable suspicion could govern the issuance of a court order.146 In
Karo, the government argued that if the electronic monitoring was a
search, a warrant should issue on a showing of reasonable suspicion
rather than probable cause. 1 47 The Court declined to decide the
issue, stating that "[i]t will be time enough to resolve the probable
cause-reasonable suspicion issue in a case that requires it."' 48 If the
Fourth Amendment did require a warrant to issue upon probable
cause, the Court would have had no problem dismissing the govern-
ment's contention. Instead, the Court reserved the issue for another
day. By doing so, it gave substance to the argument that a warrant
may issue on less than probable cause.
IV. STATUTORY PROTECTION
Given the inconsistency with existing Fourth Amendment law and
the impracticality of its application, the "mosaic theory" should be
rejected in Fourth Amendment law. 149 The unrestricted use of pat-
tern-detecting devices, however, would have a substantial and deleteri-
ous effect on privacy. A response to this threat, therefore, should be
145 See United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding, before
Knotts, that regardless of whether the attachment and monitoring of an electronic
tracking device was a search, reasonable suspicion justified such use); see also United
States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 113 n.3 (1st Cir. 1977) (concluding that probable cause
was satisfied in the case at hand, but not foreclosing a standard less than probable
cause). But see Marks & Batey, supra note 134, at 1001 (criticizing such a standard in
the context of electronic tracking devices as being too unrestrictive).
146 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (holding that "reasonable
suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human
behavior").
147 See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 n.5 (1984).
148 Id.
149 Some commentators have argued that despite the problems of the theory's
application, the "mosaic theory" is nevertheless a viable theory in Fourth Amendment
law. See Sanchez, supra note 11 ("Sorting all of this out going forward is likely to be
every bit as big a headache as [Professor Kerr] suggests. But if the Fourth Amend-
ment has a point-if it enjoins us to preserve a particular balance between state power
and individual autonomy-then as technology changes, its rules of application may
need to get more complicated to track that purpose, as they did when the Court ruled
that an admirably simple property rule was no longer an adequate criterion for identi-
fying a 'search.'").
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statutorily-based.150  Many pattern-detecting investigatory tech-
niques-pen registers, trap and trace devices 151 and mail covers15 2-
are regulated by federal statute, with the standard for issuance varying
with respect to the perceived level of intrusiveness of the particular
investigatory method. Other investigative techniques-such as the
use of electronic tracking devices153-are relatively unregulated. To
150 If the "mosaic theory" does survive in the Fourth Amendment, statutory regula-
tion must be provided to supplement the existing "mosaic theory" jurisprudence.
Without such regulation, the theory will remain unworkable in application. See supra
Part III.
151 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act regulates how law enforcement
may utilize pen registers and trap and trace devices in criminal investigations. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 18 U.S.C. § 3122(a) authorizes an
attorney for the government or a state investigative or law enforcement officer to
apply for an order to install and use a pen register or a trap and trace device. See 18
U.S.C. §3122(a) (2006). An application must include "a certification by the applicant
that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion being conducted by [the applicant] agency." Id. § 3122(b) (2); see also I FISHMAN
& McKENNA, supra note 83, § 4:13 ("The most noteworthy aspect of § 3122(b) (2) is
that it does not require a statement of facts establishing probable cause or reasonable
suspicion to believe that the register or trap-and-trace device will produce 'informa-
tion ... likely to be relevant' to a criminal investigation. All that is required, by way of
factual justification, is a certification to that effect." (alteration in original)). Upon
application, a court shall issue the order if it finds that the applicant has made the
requisite certification of relevancy. See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a); see also S. REP. No. 99-541,
at 47 (1986) ("[§ 3123(a)] does not envision an independent judicial review of
whether the application meets the relevance standard, rather the court needs only to
review the completeness of the certification submitted."). The order authorizes the
use of the pen register or a trap and trace device for a period not to exceed sixty days,
although extensions may be granted. See 18 U.S.C. § 3123(c). Thus, the certification
of relevancy required for the issuance of a pen register or a trap and trace device is far
less stringent than a statement of facts establishing probable cause or reasonable
suspicion.
152 See 39 C.F.R. § 233.3 (2010). Before the United States Postal Service can issue
a mail cover order, the requesting law enforcement agency must specify, in a written
request, "reasonable grounds to demonstrate the mail cover is necessary to: (i) Pro-
tect the national security, (ii) Locate a fugitive, (iii) Obtain information regarding the
commission or attempted commission of a crime, or (iv) Assist in the identification of
property, proceeds or assets forfeitable because of a violation of criminal law." Id.
§ 233.3(e) (2); see also 2 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 29.7 (3d ed.
2000) ("Mail covers may still be used to investigate virtually any crime."). Thus, not
only are mail cover orders issued to investigate a wide array of crimes, the standard to
be met is lower than that required to obtain a warrant.
153 Unlike other types of investigatory techniques, electronic tracking devices are
relatively unregulated. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) governs jurisdictional aspects of the use of
tracking devices. See 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a). The statute provides that courts otherwise
authorized to issue a warrant or other order for the installation of such a device can
authorize the use of the device outside the court's own jurisdiction. See id. It does
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protect privacy, Congress must enact legislative standards regulating
both developing and existing unregulated pattern-detecting
technologies. 154
Some commentators have opined that protection against invasive
technologies can be provided by legislative enactment. 155  Others
argue that legislative protection is more of an "aspiration than real-
ity," 156 or contend that courts have a duty to protect invasions of pri-
vacy, and that legislative enactments should be supplementary to
judicial efforts to provide protection. 157 Certainly the idea of Con-
not, however, require police to obtain court orders before installing or monitoring a
tracking device nor provide law enforcement guidance in the use of the device. Rule
41(b) (4) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides some guidance on the
requirements for the issuance of a warrant for electronic tracking devices. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 41(b)(4). Pursuant to Rule 41, district magistrate judges have the authority
to authorize the installation and use of electronic tracking devices to track an individ-
ual both within and outside of the district. See id. Upon application, a magistrate
judge must issue the tracking warrant if there is probable cause. See id. R. 41(d)(1).
A tracking device warrant must identify the target of the tracking and must specify a
reasonable length of time that the device may be used, not exceeding forty-five days.
See id. R. 41(e) (2) (C). This rule does not address whether law enforcement officers
need a warrant to install or monitor a tracking device.
154 This Note does not suggest that Congress should be the sole protector of pri-
vacy against invasive technologies. Rather, courts should continue, and in fact have a
duty to continue, analyzing the use of new and existing technologies in criminal inves-
tigations against the Fourth Amendment. What this Note suggests is that pattern-
detecting technologies which have not been deemed searches in the first instance
should be statutorily regulated to curb the potential deleterious effect on privacy
from the continuous and prolonged use of such devices.
155 See 2 FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 83, § 29:40 (recommending Congress
enact legislation to regulate all aspects of tracking device surveillance by requiring law
enforcement officials to obtain a court order based upon reasonable suspicion); Kerr,
supra note 94, at 806 (contending that "the legislative branch rather than the judici-
ary should create the primary investigative rules when technology is changing").
156 Renre McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts ? GPS Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. Rv. 409, 412 n.3 (2007).
157 See Blitz, supra note 107, at 1421 (recognizing arguments for a statutory solu-
tion to video surveillance, but concluding that courts "are not powerless to judge
when the surveillance schemes involved in a particular dispute leave citizens with too
little privacy"); Sherry F. Colb, A World Without Privacy: Why Property Does Not Define the
Limits of the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 102 MICH. L. REv. 889, 903
(2004) ("Congress [may be] as good as or better than the courts at protecting privacy,
but absent some reason to think that the courts will systematically overprotect privacy,
the fact that we can generally rely upon the democratic process is no reason to forego
the additional protection for individual rights that the judiciary affords for those occa-
sions when majority rule threatens to become majority tyranny."); Slobogin, supra
note 109, at 286-87 (arguing that courts should provide legislative bodies with a "con-
stitutional road map" for the regulation of public surveillance); Peter P. Swire, Katz Is
Dead. Long Live Katz., 102 MICH. L. REv. 904, 919 (2004) (contending that an
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gress enacting legal standards that govern investigatory techniques in
criminal investigations is not novel. Congress has, for instance,
promulgated standards for the use of new technologies after the
Supreme Court has ruled that they are a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. For example, after the Court held in Berger
v. New York158 and Katz15 9 that wiretapping and bugging fell within the
ambit of the Fourth Amendment, Congress enacted Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,160 which has
since governed the interception of oral and wire communications. 161
Title III was significantly amended by Tidle I of the ECPA to include
"electronic communications" to the types of communications pro-
tected from interception. 62 When a court assesses the constitutional-
ity of the governmental use of such electronic surveillance, it often
looks to the mandates of Title III and goes no further.1 63
Congress has also implemented standards for the use of certain
technologies in criminal investigations after the Court has held such
use to fall outside of the Fourth Amendment. After the Court in Smith
v. Maryland 64 held that the installation and use of a pen register did
not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment, Congress passed Title III of the ECPA, the Pen Register and
Trap and Trace Devices Statute, which provided protection from the
use of such devices. 165 Further, Congress has enacted regulation
approach where Congress took the primary responsibility for enacting privacy protec-
tions "would quite likely result in an impoverishment of the legislative debate about
privacy and surveillance, and less effective deliberation on what safeguards are
appropriate").
158 388 U.S. 41, 54-60 (1967) (holding that wiretapping under the New York wire-
tapping law did not satisfy the Fourth Amendment).
159 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("The Government's activities
in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated the privacy
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted
a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
160 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit.
III, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2006 & Supp.
1II 2009)).
161 See supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text.
162 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
§§ 101-111, 100 Stat. 1848, 1848-59 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2522).
163 See Kerr, supra note 94, at 850 ("When confronted with claims that wiretapping
violated the Fourth Amendment, courts typically fall back on the statutory protections
of Title III and go no further.").
164 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
165 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
§§ 301-303, 100 Stat. 1848, 1868-73 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
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aimed at invasive technologies that have yet to be addressed by the
Court. For example, Title II of the ECPA, referred to as the Stored
Communications Act, was enacted to regulate the storage of e-mails
and Internet communications. 166 Even in the absence of statutorily
mandated standards, rather than formulating Fourth Amendment
standards, courts have adopted the statutory framework of other legis-
lation. 167 Thus, in deciding the appropriate level of regulation for
unregulated pattern-detecting technology in criminal investigations,
Congress can look at its past body of work.
The implementation of legislative standards would be beneficial
in several respects. 168 First, legislative standards would provide law
enforcement with a workable set of investigatory standards. Provisions
governing the issuance of court orders would provide law enforce-
ment agents and judges clarity with respect to what information must
be produced and what standard of review must be met. Any fear that
subsequent monitoring would cross the mosaic threshold and render
the entirety of an investigation unconstitutional would be eliminated.
Second, abuses of investigatory techniques outside of the reach of the
Fourth Amendment will be curbed-and privacy thus enhanced-by
judicial review. Indiscriminate monitoring will be checked by the
establishment of a standard of review for issuance and by providing a
maximum period of permissible monitoring. Third, Congress has the
flexibility to enact, amend, or repeal law until a proper balance is
struck between individual privacy and police investigatory powers. 16 9
§§ 3121-3127); see also supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing the statu-
tory regulation of law enforcement use of pen registers and trap and trace devices in
criminal investigations).
166 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
§§ 201-202, 100 Star. 1848, 1860-68 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2712).
167 See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
168 See 2 FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 83, § 29:40 (noting benefits of the
implementation of electronic tracking legislation to be (1) "enhancing individual pri-
vacy and providing a check against potential abuse" by providing judicial review; (2)
"enhanc[ing] effective law enforcement" by providing clarity in the law; and (3)
"establish [ing] standardized procedures governing the issuance and execution of
such court orders"); Kerr, supra note 94, at 859 ("The context of legislative rule-crea-
tion offers significantly better prospects for the generation of balanced, nuanced, and
effective investigative rules involving new technologies.").
169 See Kerr, supra note 94, at 871 ("Legislatures can experiment with different
rules and make frequent amendments; they can place restrictions on both public and
private actors; and they can even 'sunset' rules so that they apply only for a particular
period of time. The courts cannot. As a result, Fourth Amendment rules will tend to
lack the flexibility that a regulatory response to new technologies may require." (foot-
notes omitted)).
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It is one thing to say that the legislature, rather than the Court,
should be charged with providing standards governing the use of pat-
tern-detecting investigatory techniques in criminal investigations, and
quite another to define precisely what the appropriate standard
should be. Certainly some level of particularized suspicion is neces-
sary. 170 The precise amount, however, should reflect the intrusiveness
of the investigatory method. One possibility is an amendment for the
inclusion of pattern-detecting technologies in Title III. Such an
amendment, however, is only appropriate if the technology is of such
an intrusive and indiscriminate nature as to warrant the heightened
requirements of Title III. Here, it is not likely that location patterns
are of such an intrusive and indiscriminate nature as to render Title
III applicable. As for indiscriminateness, the use of location patterns
is just as indiscriminate as wiretapping, bugging, or even video surveil-
lance. That is, electronic tracking will pick up all locations within
electronic reach, without regard to the relevance of the location to
the investigation. Unlike wiretapping, bugging, or video surveillance,
the use of pattern-detecting technologies is not more invasive of pri-
vacy. 171 Surely a video of an individual walking into a particular build-
ing or the interception of the conversation that ensued while the
individual was at the location is more invasive than the physical coor-
dinates of such location. Not only do the devices not pick up sounds
or video, the geographical coordinates will not in and of themselves
confirm that a particular individual was at each particular place within
the pattern. The coordinates do not reveal who was in the vehicle,
what was happening or what was said in the vehicle, or whether an
individual in fact exited the vehicle to visit a specific location. What
this analysis suggests is that while the use of electronic tracking devices
to intercept digital location patterns may be just as indiscriminate as
traditional forms of surveillance covered by Title III, it is much less
invasive and thus should not be subject to Title III's restrictive
requirements.
Moreover, if location pattern-detecting technology was so indis-
criminate and invasive to warrant the application of Title III require-
ments, Title III would provide overbroad protection. The
requirements of Tide III extend only to "oral communications" in
170 See Solove, supra note 15, at 1109 ("Particularized suspicion keeps the govern-
ment's profound investigative powers in check preventing widespread surveillance
and snooping into the lives and affairs of all citizens.").
171 See 2 FSHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 83, § 29:26 (noting that electronic track-
ing is far less intrusive than other investigatory techniques, such as wiretapping and
eavesdropping).
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which individuals have ajustifiable expectation of non-interception. 172
This limitation, however, is absent in the definition of both wire and
electronic communications. 173 As pattern-detecting technology would
fall under wire or electronic communication, the communication is
protected from unauthorized interception even if the participants do
not have ajustifiable expectation of non-interception. 74 Accordingly,
Title III would treat all types of pattern information as protected,
regardless of whether such information would be deserving of protec-
tion under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, a higher standard than
probable cause is not appropriate for location pattern-detecting
technologies.175
The conclusion that the heightened requirements of Title III are
not appropriate for pattern-detecting technologies leaves Congress
with alternatives such as probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or a
statement of relevance. The question of the precise level of protec-
tion should be left to Congress-a body with the institutional capacity
and experience to make such a decision.
CONCLUSION
The use of emerging and existing intrusive technologies in crimi-
nal investigations certainly has the potential to have a substantial
effect on privacy. In an effort to combat the threat of such use, May-
nard introduced the "mosaic theory" into Fourth Amendment law.
The "mosaic theory" holds that individual law enforcement acts that
are not "searches" become a "search" when aggregated, as the whole
reveals more than the individual acts it comprises. This Note suggests
that despite the intuitive appeal of a "mosaic theory," the use of the
172 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2006); see also 1 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 83,
§ 2.24 (describing concept as the "expectation of non-interception").
173 See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1); id. § 2510(12).
174 See Orin S. Kerr, Are We Overprotecting Code? Thoughts on First-Generation Internet
Law, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1287, 1300 (2000) (criticizing the justifiable expectation
of non-interception language in the context of internet communications as it would
cover not only private internet communications, but also "[w]eb pages in transit, com-
mands sent to remote servers, picture or music files, network support traffic, and
almost everything else in cyberspace"); Simmons, supra note 34, at 1340-41 ("In this
sense, statutory protection for electronic communications is too broad, treating all
internet traffic as deserving of an equal amount of protection and thus forcing gov-
ernment agents to acquire a Title III order for even the most mundane transmissions
that would not deserve privacy under the Katz test.").
175 See 1 LAFAVE, supra note 20, § 2.7(e) (rejecting a higher standard than proba-
ble cause with respect to location monitoring as "[a]scertaining the location of an
object on a continuing basis falls far short of the repeated interception of private
conversations").
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theory in Fourth Amendment law is misguided. The "mosaic theory"
is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's voluntary exposure analysis,
which has often classified theoretical or limited disclosures of infor-
mation as complete exposures warranting no Fourth Amendment pro-
tection. 176 It is also inconsistent with the Supreme Court's implicit
rejection of the proposition that the Fourth Amendment analysis is
altered when an investigatory technique is prolonged to the point
where information may be accumulated. 177
Not only is the theory inconsistent with existing Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, it is also impractical in application. A problem-
atic question arises as to what durational threshold must be crossed in
order for the use of a pattern-detecting technology to be sufficiently
prolonged as to render it a search. Once this illusive threshold is
crossed and a mosaic is created, the question that then arises is how to
define the scope of the mosaic. If a pattern is created only through
the use of multiple investigatory techniques, the entire investigation
will be rendered a search. Also left unanswered is the appropriate
standard of review for the use of pattern-detecting investigatory tech-
niques in criminal investigations. The most serious implication of the
theory, however, is that it calls into question a number of previously
accepted investigatory techniques.
The "mosaic theory," if applied consistently, would revolutionize
the Fourth Amendment and how criminal investigations are con-
ducted. Such a revolutionary response to pattern-detecting technolo-
gies and investigative techniques is hardly the type of judicial restraint
recently urged by the Supreme Court in City of Ontario v. Quon.178
Rather than regulating pattern-detecting techniques constitutionally
at the aggregate level, privacy interests should be statutorily protected.
176 See supra note 83.
177 See supra note 89-92 and accompanying text.
178 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) ("The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully
on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in
society has become clear." (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), and Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967))).
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